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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Determinations about unconscionability are subjective.  To date no one has been 
able to articulate an objective standard.  Statutes that empower the judiciary to make 
findings of unconscionability almost uniformly fail to define what qualifies.2  Judges 
are left to fashion solutions that they, and they alone, believe address their charge.  
Different results from different judges are what can reasonably be expected absent an 
agreed upon definition.3  The issue takes on the character of the debate some decades 
ago around defining pornography.  Recall the famous statement by Mr. Justice 
Stewart who acknowledged defeat in arriving at an actual definition of pornography 
                                                                
1Of Counsel, Banks Shapiro Gettinger & Waldinger, Mt. Kisco, N.Y. B.A. Case Western 
Reserve University, J.D. New York Law School.  I wish to thank the Hon. Charles G. Banks 
for his valuable comments and insights as well as Hilary B. Miller, Esq., for his valuable 
suggestions, insights and persistent skepticism. 
2An exception is § 2-719(b)(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code that defines 
unconscionability as: “Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to 
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of 
damages where the loss is commercial is not.”  U.C.C. § 2-719(b)(3) (1998).  In New York the 
General Business Law, § 396(r) defines price gouging during “abnormal disruptions of the 
market” as being unconscionable.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396(r) (McKinney 2004). 
3“The decided cases do not invoke the doctrine of unconscionability in any systematic or 
even coherent way. Claims of substantive unfairness are mixed with suggestions of fraud, 
cognitive deficiency and duress, so that it is not possible to discern a pattern in the factual 
situations.”  CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTS AS A PROMISE 103 (1981). 
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but who nevertheless declared categorically: “I could never succeed intelligibly in 
doing so.  But I know it when I see it.”4  
If only it were so simple!  As Professor Leff noted in his landmark treatise on the 
subject of unconscionability,5 “[W]hat may permissibly make the judges’ pulses race 
or their cheeks redden, as so to justify the destruction of a particular provision, is, 
one would suppose, what the judge ought to have been told by the statute.”6  Leff 
concludes that there is “nothing clear about the meaning of ‘unconscionable’ except 
perhaps that it is pejorative.”7  He goes on to say that without more of a definition, 
all attempts are doomed to failure, and concludes, “[I]t is easy to say nothing with 
words.”8
From the perspective of the legislature, the failure to settle on an acceptable 
definition is no accident.  By charging the courts to make determinations “as a 
matter of law,” legislatures have created a failsafe mechanism for protecting against 
any predatory practices not otherwise addressed by the law, practices that might 
create an uneven playing field for those who lack either the ability or the savvy to 
realize what it is they are confronting.  Of course, this assumes that there is a need 
for a failsafe mechanism in the first place.  This Article argues that the need is really 
quite limited because the existing legislative designs are so complex and so far 
reaching that the doctrine of unconscionability, as it presently exists, is no longer 
required.  It is time to update the doctrine to reflect current conditions.  One of the 
byproducts of the updating process is the acceptance of a definition that eliminates, 
to the extent possible, subjectivity. 
How does subjectivity come into play?  I submit that subjectivity is a function of 
the focus of analysis.  Courts determine unconscionability by determining how a 
suspect term impacts the parties to the agreement.  I propose a different approach.  I 
suggest that rather than looking at the impact on the parties, the focus should be on 
the impact that a suspect term has on third parties.  With this in mind, I submit that a 
term is unconscionable only if: 
1. With respect to any contract: 
a. The term undermines the integrity of the contracting system itself, or 
b. The term undermines the integrity of any statutory scheme granting to a 
court the power to review agreements allowed by the statutory scheme. 
2. With respect to matrimonial agreements: 
a. The operation of the term appears likely to result in any party to the 
agreement seeking public assistance, or 
b. The term interferes with the ability of a party to seek reform to avoid having 
to seek public assistance, or 
c. Adversely impacts the interests of children of the marriage. 
                                                                
4Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
5Professor Leff was commenting on § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
6Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
7Id. at 487. 
8Id. at 559. 
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Issues of unconscionability are most often encountered in two arenas: 
commercial agreements9 and family law agreements.  In the first arena this Article 
proposes that the analysis should focus on the impact of a suspect term on the 
integrity of the contracting system or to an enabling statute.  If a contract term 
materially undermines or compromises the integrity of the system for contracting or 
the integrity of an enabling statute, it should be found unconscionable.  In the family 
law arena things differ because of the substance of the relationships involved and 
because the need for mutual consideration is de-emphasized.  Accordingly, in this 
arena there are additional criteria.  If the term has a materially adverse impact on the 
state as the default provider of public assistance, or if the term interferes with the 
ability of a party to seek reform to avoid having to petition for public assistance, or if 
the term adversely impacts the interests of children of the marriage, it should also be 
deemed unconscionable.  
In all other instances and in either arena, where there is concern about either the 
conditions that brought about a term or the operation of the term on the parties 
themselves, there is no need for the court to consider unconscionability.  
What do I mean by “undermining of the integrity of the contracting process”?  
This Article proposes that where enforcement of a term creates a precedent that is in 
conflict with an established requirement for an otherwise acceptable and enforceable 
contract, or where enforcement of a term would sanction a violation of public policy, 
it can be said that the term undermines the integrity of the contracting process.  For 
example, if a contract is framed as a mutual exchange but contains a term that 
defeats this purpose and is in reality nothing more than an illusion, it can be said that 
to uphold it would defeat a basic purpose for the contracting process.  The same rules 
of construction apply to the undermining of the integrity of an enabling statute. 
At first glance the proposal may seem strange.  After all, the proposal is at odds 
with all settled thinking about unconscionability.  But it really goes to the heart of 
the problem.  In today’s world we find a plethora of regulatory programs applicable 
to a wide variety of schemes and contracts.  The need to protect contracting parties 
through indeterminate judicial oversight has been, in large measure, supplanted by 
legislation.  The traditional purposes supporting the doctrine of unconscionability 
have been dramatically diluted by these schemes.  Where there is no controlling 
legislation, the primary and overriding purpose for the doctrine should be to protect a 
public interest and/or the interests of those who, while not parties to the negotiations 
can be nevertheless directly and adversely impacted by the terms of the contract.  In 
short, the parties themselves should expect to be bound by their arrangement subject 
to public policy concerns.  Protection of the parties from an unwise arrangement is 
unwarranted unless there is a legislative foundation for the judgment.  
Claims of “unfairness” resulting from inequalities in bargaining power, over 
reaching, oppression or any one of a myriad of other conditions mentioned later in 
this article, are trumped by the reality that not signing a given agreement is always 
an option.  Removing these excuses from the determination of unconscionability 
deletes from the equation the unbridled subjectivity that is so prevalent today.  The 
question is no longer “why did the party sign” but rather “what consequences does 
                                                                
9Commercial agreements include the full spectrum including business-to-business 
agreements, consumer agreements and employment agreements. 
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enforcement of this agreement have for the legal system?”  The answer to the revised 
question yields a ruling as a matter of law.  
It is axiomatic that parties to any contract must stand behind their commitments, 
even if it turns out that with the advantage of hindsight a commitment seems to be 
unwise.  Society does not and should not, have an interest in determining the 
propriety of a given contract.  The public interest is in making sure that a term is 
enforceable unless it operates to undermine the overall integrity of the contracting 
process.  Within this framework, unconscionability should be said to be available as 
a defense only when it is believed that a given term serves to undermine the integrity 
of the system of contracting.  This approach provides a definition for 
unconscionability.  If the concept of unconscionability is thus limited, the scope of 
subjectivity is in turn limited to determinations about what does and what does not 
undermine the reliability of our system of contracting. 
The present method of defining unconscionability focuses on the impact of a 
given term solely on the immediate parties to the agreement.10  If determinations of 
unconscionability are deemed sui generis, the rulings have no precedential value as 
each ruling is tailored solely to the facts of the case before the court.  This, in and of 
itself, is questionable, where the ruling is made under the authority of the Uniform 
Commercial Code or similar statutes, because of the requirement that such 
determinations be made as a matter of law, not fact.11 Moreover, there is a very 
                                                                
10The current focus is thought by some to be intentional.  See Ex Parte Foster, 758 So. 2d 
516, 521 n.4 (Ala. 1999) (“Alabama law provides no explicit standard for determining whether 
a contractual provision is unconscionable; instead, each case must be decided on its own facts, 
based on several important factors that encompass aspects of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability”).  In Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906 (Kan. 1976), 
the court observed that “[t]he UCC neither defines the concept of unconscionability nor 
provides the elements or perimeters of the doctrine. Perhaps this was the real intent of the 
drafters of the code. To define the doctrine is to limit its application, and to limit its 
application is to defeat its purpose.” 
11See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial 
setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination.  
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998) (emphasis added). 
New York has a similar statute tailored for real estate leases. 
1. If the court as a matter of law finds a lease or any clause of the lease 
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the lease, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease 
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
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subtle implication inherent in the sui generis approach.  Beneath the surface these 
determinations become the foundation for the doctrine that courts should be 
encouraged to utilize subjectivity when reaching determinations about 
unconscionability.  Implied is the suggestion that courts act properly by leveling the 
playing field when the legislature fails to do so.  Without placing limitations on 
subjectivity there is a real risk that the judiciary will use its discretion to promote 
social concerns.  Provisions in the fine print of an agreement, say, eliminating a 
warranty, may appear unconscionable to a judge who favors consumer protection but 
may seem reasonable to a judge who believes such matters are best determined by 
the legislature.12 Similarly, an arbitration clause in a sales agreement may seem 
unconscionable to a court concerned about a unilateral obligation for arbitration, but 
may be perfectly acceptable to a court that is concerned with the efficiency of an 
arbitration clause.13
It is time to update the doctrine by taking these realities into account.  The failure 
to modernize the doctrine has four undesirable and yet avoidable consequences:  (1) 
Decisions that are to be made as a matter of law are actually limited to unique factual 
circumstances and are therefore of little precedential value.  (2) The existing doctrine 
can be used to correct for buyer’s regret.  This consequence implies that the law is an 
instrument to be used to undermine, not fortify, the integrity of the contracting 
process because it encourages contracting parties to believe that it is acceptable to 
enter into an agreement without really meaning it.  (3) Decisions are inconsistent, 
making predictability all but impossible.  (4) The doctrine is positioned as a platform 
for judicial activism concerning areas of social policy best addressed by the rigors of 
the legislative and political processes. 
Existing law contains seeds that, if properly cultivated can be extended to support 
the proposal outlined in this Article.  This is especially true in the family law arena 
where much has already been done to reduce judicial activism and unrestrained 
subjectivity.  In this arena unknowns associated with the so-called “procedural” 
component of unconscionability, i.e., the conduct of the parties during the contract 
formation process, have been almost entirely defined by legislation.  But even in this 
arena, much room still exists for improvement. 
Consider the consequences of a finding of unconscionability.  It affords relief 
from the consequences of the commitment by a party who participated in the 
                                                          
2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lease or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose 
and effect to aid the court in making the determination.  
(emphasis added).  New York Real Property Law § 235–c (McKinney 2004). 
12See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 491-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1982). 
13Compare Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002) with 
Conseco Fin. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).  In Green Tree Fin. Corp. 
v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409, 416 (Ala. 1999), the court summarized the controversy: “The 
doctrine remains on the launch pad, regardless of personal views regarding the efficacy of 
arbitration versus litigation in certain settings, until such time as Congress or the United States 
Supreme Court directs otherwise.” For a detailed discussion of the controversy within the 
context of employment agreements, compare Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So. 2d 1329 (Ala. 
1997), with Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).   
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negotiations and accepted a given term.  It is a “get out of jail free” card, valuable 
currency, which should not be made readily available.  The parties to an agreement 
should not be encouraged to expect relief from missteps or bad judgment simply 
because one or more of the parties later perceives that an accepted term is unfair.  If 
the judicial system is drawn into such a quagmire, it risks protecting contracting 
parties from their own mistakes or whims.  There is no public interest in such an 
outcome unless it serves to protect an underlying interest benefiting the greater good. 
Even the vocabulary used to describe the situs of unconscionability, “procedural” 
and “substantive,” bespeaks attitudes about the impact of the agreement on the 
parties and not the interests that society has in the contracting process or an enabling 
statute.  Neither component suggests any concern for the collateral impact of a 
suspect term on those not a party to the contract. 
The result is a thicket of conflicting decisions and unstructured rules that cite as 
the basis for unconscionability vague terms such as “oppression”, “unfair surprise”, 
“harshness”, “unequal bargaining power”, “overly harsh”, “one-sided”, 
“unreasonably favorable to the drafter”, and “shocks the conscience”.  These words 
say very little, perhaps even nothing, if they are employed in a vacuum.  Why is 
disparity of bargaining power relevant? How much disparity is needed to create the 
imbalance that is proffered to be problematic? Why is a party’s education a 
consideration, given the reality that some very well educated people are still unable 
to comprehend all the implications of a given term and that some very savvy 
individuals lack any education at all? How much education is required to ensure that 
a party can be said to have entirely comprehended the consequences of a given term 
or agreement? When, as a matter of law, is a contracting term harsh or oppressive? 
When, as a matter of law, is a surprise unfair? The list goes on and on.  Something 
more tangible is required, i.e., a context that incorporates the fundamental concerns 
of society in resolving the issues troubling contracting parties.  The contextual 
framework advocated in this article reduces the considerations involved in the final 
judicial determinations and makes it easier to predict the outcome.  Without such a 
contextual framework, the muddle knows no bounds. 
The uncertainty resulting from the current approach led one judge, commenting 
on a family law agreement, to observe: 
The majority’s disregard of our standard of review and its application of a 
nebulous unconscionability standard invites, even compels, judges to 
patronizingly and paternalistically meddle in the proposed stipulations of 
presumptively competent divorcing adults, with very little guidance or 
principle other than our own personal sense of what feels fair and right.  
That strikes me as the very essence of a government of people, rather than 
a government of laws.  When the outcome of a case can depend not upon 
rules, laws and standards of review, but upon what strikes appellate judges 
as fair and equitable, then this Court has assumed more power than wise 
people ought to be comfortable exercising.14
To some, what this Article proposes may seem quite harsh.  They would argue 
that the playing field is uneven and that courts should properly become involved in 
the restoration of fairness when the need presents itself.  The answer to these critics 
                                                                
14Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 837 (N.D. 1994) (Neumann, J. dissenting). 
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is that the playing field really is not as distorted as they may fear.  On balance the 
benefits realized by modifying the doctrine, i.e., reduced subjectivity and judicial 
activism, trump the fears of those who perceive the need for a fail-safe mechanism 
even if it permits unrestrained judicial subjectivity.  
This Article’s proposal will no doubt have its detractors in the ranks of the 
judiciary for understandable reasons.  To date, the judiciary has willingly struggled 
with the challenges inherent in a definitional vacuum.  From this great effort has 
emerged a search for what is fair and just.  But in reality, this focus has resulted in a 
system that is rife with confusion and unpredictability.  With time, that perspective 
will change and the judiciary will depart from the present methodology in favor of a 
system that supports the public good by providing a simpler and more predictable 
system for dealing with the question of what is unconscionable. 
Finally, my proposal does not leave contracting parties out in the cold.  If it is 
agreed that a given practice is thought to be sufficiently offensive and unfair as to 
require a declaration that it is against the public’s interest, the proper forum for that 
debate should be before the legislature where a system of regulation can be 
considered and adopted.  Whatever the issue, the legislative process is best suited to 
finding a solution that has broad application, as is evidenced by the existing 
abundance of legislative schemes governing areas such as consumer contracts and 
credit, insurance, credit cards, auto leasing, mortgages, sale of securities and real 
estate offerings and, of course, domestic relations.15  
In this Article I also restate the vocabulary traditionally used to describe 
unconscionability.  Virtually all courts have come to accept the idea that there are 
two “components” for describing the geography associated with unconscionability, 
i.e., procedural and substantive unconscionability.16 This system for arranging the 
judicial inquiry does not provide a definition of unconscionability.  It just tells us 
where to look for evidence of unconscionability.  Procedural unconscionability 
relates to the actions of the parties during the negotiations leading up to the 
acceptance of a given term. For example, perhaps one party takes unfair advantage 
during the negotiation process by embedding a term deep into a series of form 
contracts where it is unlikely it will be uncovered.  This scenario has been declared 
by some courts to be evidence of procedural unconscionability.17 Procedural 
unconscionability is about the actions of the parties and not about the actual 
operation of the agreement.  
Substantive unconscionability is focused on the operation of the terms of the 
contract on a given party.  For instance, contracts that entitle one party to litigate in 
the courts while compelling the other party to resort to arbitration have been found to 
be substantively unconscionable.18
                                                                
15For example, if it is determined that it is unfair to privately mandate that disputes about 
malpractice claims must be submitted to arbitration, legislation can be put in place to address 
such a practice.  See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
16These terms have even found their way into some of the controlling legislation. See 
MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (1a), (2) (c ) (2004). 
17See Sivestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968); 
Kinney v. United Healthcare Serv., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1329-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
18See cases cited supra note 13. Compare Rosenberg v. Merril, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) with Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F. 3d 173 (3d 
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The problem is that in accepting the terminology, the courts inadvertently 
superimpose another layer of complexity into the analysis requiring one to first ask, 
what is meant by the nomenclature? The terms seem to take on a life all their own.  
In virtually all reported decisions involving the doctrine, courts feel compelled to 
devote at minimum multiple paragraphs of explanation about what their terminology 
is intended to do.  Since the terms describe something, is it not better to just say what 
they describe and go from there?  
Using the accepted terms, the judicial inquiry about unconscionability is as 
follows:  Can a court arrive at a determination as to unconscionability if there is only 
a showing of either procedural or substantive unconscionability or must both 
components be established?   
This statement actually contains five questions adding unnecessary complexity to 
any analysis.  The questions are:  (1) What is meant by procedural?  (2) What facts 
constitute procedural?  (3) What is meant by substantive?  (4) What facts constitute 
substantive? And (5) must there be a showing of both procedural and substantive 
facts?  Instead, why not simply ask: During the negotiations leading to a contract 
have the parties done anything that is unconscionable, and if so, did it result in a term 
or agreement that operates in an unconscionable manner? This would greatly 
simplify the analysis because it focuses the inquiry on what is and what is not 
unconscionable, not on what is first meant by procedural or substantive and, only 
then, what is meant by unconscionable.  
Part II of this Article examines in detail the proposition that unconscionability 
refers solely to the degradation of the integrity of the contracting process as 
applicable to the commercial arena.  Part III examines the issue within the context of 
family law.  
II.  RETHINKING THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE COMMERCIAL ARENA 
This Part explores the proposition that within the commercial arena a contract 
should be deemed unconscionable only if it can be shown that its enforcement 
undermines the integrity of the contracting process as evidenced by an adverse 
impact on our system for contracting or an enabling statute.  
A.  The Basic Premise  
The freedom to contract is not without consequences.  Parties who freely enter 
into agreements are required to honor their commitments.  Through legislation and 
the courts, society provides mechanisms to insure that contracts, once made, are 
adhered to.  Society has an interest in the efficacy of this system.  For the most part 
society takes no position on the appropriateness of a contract term and does little to 
keep parties from entering into ill-advised arrangements.  But there is an apparent 
exception: unconscionability.  An assortment of statutes, some of which are situation 
regulatory schemes and some of which have broad and unspecified application, 
permit judicial intervention to regulate against the enforcement of terms or 
conditions determined as a matter of law to be unconscionable.  There is broad 
support for the proposition that an inadvisable arrangement is not unconscionable 
without something more.  That “something more” is what converts the imprudent to 
the unconscionable.  
                                                          
Cir. 1999); Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669; Iwen v. United States West Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 
1999). 
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But what qualifies as “something more”?  How does a court differentiate between 
a foolish arrangement and one that is so unfair as to be unenforceable? In the days of 
the early common law, the standard was a contract “such as no man in his senses and 
not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man 
would accept on the other.”19  This standard was adopted at a time when 
sophisticated regulatory schemes simply did not exist.  In modern times there are 
countless statutory designs that clearly provide a declaration as to what public policy 
is in matters of contract etiquette and propriety.  The judicial role as a policing agent 
has been limited by legislative fiat.  Nevertheless, courts perceive a charge to make 
determinations of unconscionability if they suspect that a given contract or term “is 
so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in light of the mores and business 
practices of the time and place as to be unenforceable according to its literal terms.”20 
But when is a contract term “grossly unreasonable”? And more importantly, why 
does society need to intervene if the integrity of the contracting process is not 
destabilized? 
Most courts make determinations about unconscionability by evaluating the 
behavior of the parties during the negotiation process and the operation of the terms 
on the parties of the contract.  At first blush that seems to make perfect sense.  But 
inherent in the simplicity of that approach is a serious risk: the court may become 
involved in a dispute in which society has no interest, and, in doing so, the court may 
establish an inappropriate precedent.  This pitfall is a by-product of the legislative 
failure to define the term “unconscionable” and the delegation of that task to the 
judiciary.  
People who sign contracts are presumed to have done so voluntarily and without 
duress.  Said another way, the parties to a contract are presumed to have acted in 
their own respective best interests during the negotiation process.  To overcome this 
presumption, facts must be presented that establish either that the negotiation process 
was tainted by duress or fraud or that the term sought to be enforced is in violation of 
public policy.  If this burden cannot be met, the plaintiff can still prove facts 
establishing unconscionability.  Facts establishing that it was not a good idea to 
assume a certain set of obligations are insufficient to overcome the presumption.  
Many courts, however, ascribe to the belief that a showing that one party or another 
has “overreached” is sufficient.  In other words, in the analysis of unconscionability, 
overreaching, duress and fraud are given the same status.  The three factors are 
thought to interfere with a true meeting of the minds and the possibility of true 
mutuality.  One can easily understand the conclusion of duress if there is proof that 
an agreement was signed while facing a loaded pistol.  Similarly, the intentional 
concealment of a material fact reasonably leads to the conclusion that there could be 
no meeting of the minds.  But in the case of a claim of “overreaching” it becomes 
more difficult, if not impossible, to know when the victim is actually trying to work 
free of an agreement that has been determined, with the advantage of hindsight, to be 
unwise.  Judicial scrutiny in the name of unconscionability based on actions or 
behavior attendant to the negotiation process is risky because of the possibility that 
the court will become involved in a de facto determination about the advisability of 
the undertaking.  It is difficult to conjure up a scenario where something less than 
                                                                
19Earl of Chesterfield v. Jannssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). 
20Mandel v. Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. 1951). 
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actual duress – that loaded pistol – can be said to actually result in someone having 
to sign a contract.  In the absence of duress, the option not to sign is always 
available. 
The same concerns are present if the determination about unconscionability is 
linked to the operations of a given term.  If the singular complaint is that the term 
operates on one of the parties in an unfair manner, the question must be asked: Why 
did he or she sign it in the first place? Absent a showing that the term impacts the 
integrity of the contracting process, the public interest is not served by judicial 
interference in what may be no more than an afterthought about propriety, because of 
the risk that the determination will be made based on a subjective determination 
about the operation of a suspect term on a party to the contract, i.e, is it “fair?”  This 
possibility is overcome if the basis for judicial involvment is restricted to claims of 
unconscionability linked to the integrity of the contracting process or an enabling 
statute.  Typical of such situations are terms that operate to render an otherwise 
enforceable agreement an illusion. 
Consider a contract pursuant to which a seller “consigns absolutely and forever” 
paintings to an art dealer who undertakes no obligation to actually sell the paintings, 
but who agrees that if a sale is realized, the seller will receive an amount equal to 
50% of the proceeds.  Assume that the attorney for the art dealer drafts the contract 
in question and the seller does not consult an attorney.  The paintings, with one 
exception, are never sold and seller receives very little in exchange for the 
consignment that is to last “absolutely and forever.” That was the situation 
confronting a New York court in In re Estate of Friedman.21 While the court 
discussed the “substantive” and “procedural” problems it identified, these were given 
a second tier position for the determination of unconscionability.  The court found as 
the central reason for declaring the agreement unconscionable that it was so illusory 
as to lack mutual consideration, and in so doing squarely recognized that, if the 
agreement were allowed to stand, the integrity of the contracting process would have 
been undermined.22 Moreover, in reaching its decision, the court took into account 
the accepted business practices of the art field23 and thereby acknowledged that any 
                                                                
21407 N.Y.S.2d 999 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). 
22“In sum, the ‘consideration’ given for this ‘sale’ was so contingent and so dependent 
upon the discretion of one who had a ‘built-in’ conflict of interest as to be grossly inadequate.  
This patent inadequacy so permeates the ‘agreement’ as to render it unconscionable. As 
Virginia Zabriskie put it at the hearing,  ‘[there] is nothing in it for the artist.’” Id. at 1009. 
23The court stated in its opinion: 
At the hearing before the Surrogate, three expert witnesses testified for petitioner as to 
the regular method of dealing  (“usage of trade”) between artists and art dealers. 
Virginia Zabriskie, an art dealer who has operated the Zabriskie Gallery in New York 
City for 22 years (and who also operates a gallery in Paris), testified that dealers 
generally take paintings on consignment or purchase them outright. In the former case, 
the consignment would normally be for two years because artists usually want to be 
shown at least every two years.  Estates would consign paintings for a longer period of 
time and might be exhibited every three years.  The longest consignment she had ever 
handled was five years, and she has never heard of a consignment lasting 14 years or 
more.  When a dealer purchases paintings outright, the consideration is an 
“[absolutely] fixed sum” of money payable “[then] and there” or “over a period of 
time”.  The contract under consideration at bar is not customary in the art field 
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ruling upholding the agreement would be against prevailing industry standards.  And 
finally, the decision of this court was free of any subjective test.  Unconscionability 
was defined within the context of the integrity of contracts used in the art field, with 
the impact of this particular agreement on the parties being a secondary 
consideration.  Had this court applied any other standard, it would have been 
compelled to address whether the terms were “fair” for the petitioner, a subjective 
test. 
The arbitration clause dispute presented in Villa Milano Homeowners Association 
v. Il Davorge,24 is an example of a term found to manipulate a result not otherwise 
recognized under established principles of law.  There, pursuant to state law, a 
developer of a condominium project prepared and recorded a declaration of 
covenants, conditions and restrictions that contained, among many other things, a 
clause (embedded on page 66 of the filing) that required the purchaser of a 
condominium unit to arbitrate complaints for damages arising from design defects.  
No purchaser was given an opportunity to negotiate any of the terms,25 including the 
arbitration provision.26  Most important, the court noted that the filing by the 
developer appeared to be a unilateral attempt to circumvent a statutory prohibition 
against using an arbitration clause in a real property transaction to “preclude or limit 
any right of action” for construction and design defect.27  The court held the attempt 
to circumvent state law was a shock to the conscience, and thus unconscionable,28 
                                                          
because “[there] is nothing in it for the artist”.  No objections were taken to any of 
this testimony. 
Id. at 1003. 
24102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
25The declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions contained a provision entitling 
purchasers to seek an amendment provided that with respect to the arbitration clause in 
particular, no amendment was allowed without the consent of the developer, even when the 
later no longer owned property in the complex. “With respect to the arbitration provision in 
question, then, it truly is a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition, with no opportunity for subsequent 
amendment at the sole discretion of the homeowners.”  Id. at 6. 
26“The arbitration clause provision did not comply with the procedural requirements of the 
Code for Civil Procedure in that the arbitration clause was not properly titled and displayed 
prominently in the fashion required by the Code for Civil Procedure. Moreover, purchasers of 
the units were not required to actually initial the clause upon acceptance of the terms of the 
filing, as was required by the Code for Civil Procedure.”  Id. 
27Id. at 8 (quoting § 1298.7 of the California Code of Civil Procedure).  Section 1298.7, 
Effect of arbitration provision on other causes of action, states: 
In the event an arbitration provision is included in a contract or agreement covered by 
this title it shall not preclude or limit any right of action for bodily injury or wrongful 
death, or any right of action to which Section 337.1 or 337.15 is applicable. §§ 337.1 
and 337.15 provide for a cause of action for latent deficiencies in the construction of 
real property. 
CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 1298.7 (2004). 
28The court stated: 
Il Davorge recorded the Villa Milano CC&R’s in 1992, more than three years after the 
July 1, 1989 effective date of Code of Civil Procedure section 1298.7. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1298.8.) It maintains that doing so was perfectly appropriate, because 
CC&R’s are not among the enumerated types of real property sales documentation to 
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and declared the filings in violation of the stated public policy of California.29 In 
other words, the court found that the conduct of the developer coupled with the 
operation of the clause itself, served to undermine the integrity of the contracting 
process and was thus unconscionable.  
The recent decision in Gray v. Conseco, Inc.30 involved a very different type of 
arbitration clause, one that was found not unconscionable because it presented no 
threat to the integrity of the contracting process.  Here, borrowers were required as a 
condition of a loan, to execute a note that contained an arbitration clause that was not 
binding on the lender but that was binding on the borrower.  The claim that the one-
sided nature of the clause was unconscionable was rejected on contract grounds.  The 
court held:  “First, under general principles of contract law, a non-mutual contract is 
valid and not unconscionable so long as there [is] some consideration on both sides.  
Second, a contrary rule would impose a special burden on agreements to arbitrate 
and therefore conflict with the federal policy favoring arbitration.”31
This court was able to avoid the trap of becoming involved in an illusory policy 
issue involving a perceived or claimed inequity in bargaining power and in so doing, 
refrained from establishing a precedent that would have itself been offensive to the 
integrity of the contracting system.  
                                                          
which section 1298.7 applies. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1298, 1298.7.) It appears Il 
Davorge sought to accomplish by way of the CC&R’s that which section 1298.7 
blocked it from doing via a purchase agreement. It intended to bar the individual unit 
owners from filing construction or design defect actions against it in court. This flies 
in the face of the obvious legislative intent to permit home buyers to have their 
construction and design defects claims heard in a judicial forum. It is a blatant attempt 
to curtail the statutory rights of the home buyers and simply shocks the conscience. 
102 Cal Rptr. 2d at 8. 
29The court declared: 
In construing public policy with respect to arbitration clauses, our final consideration 
is the effect of California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2791.8, n11 governing 
the contents of arbitration clauses contained in CC&R’s. The Department of Real 
Estate (DRE) adopted the regulation pursuant to Business and Professions Code 
section 11001. That section permits the adoption of regulations as reasonably 
necessary for the enforcement of the Subdivided Lands Act.  “The purpose of the 
Subdivided Lands Act ‘is to protect individual members of the public who purchase 
lots or homes from subdividers and to make sure that full information will be given to 
all purchasers concerning . . . essential facts with reference to the land.’  The law seeks 
to prevent fraud and sharp practices in a type of real estate transaction which is 
peculiarly open to such abuses.”  In furtherance of this purpose, a subdivider is 
required to obtain a DRE-issued public report concerning a development before it may 
commence sales.  As part of the public report application and review process, the 
subdivider must submit to the DRE copies of documentation it proposes to use in 
connection with the subdivision, such as the articles of incorporation and bylaws of 
the homeowners association, and the CC&R’s. 
Id. at 9-10 (internal citations omitted). 
30No. SA CV 00-322, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14821 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000). 
31Id. at *14.  For an excellent discussion of judicial attitudes towards arbitration clauses 
and the potential for unwarranted judicial activism see Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes 
Towards Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004). 
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These cases all share one common analytic factor: judicial refusal to impose 
subjective views about the underlying policy issues involved in the terms being 
challenged as unconscionable.  Instead, the court in each case resolved the matter by 
measuring the challenged term’s impact against the requirements of our system for 
meaningful private agreements.  No attempt was made to level the playing field.  In 
each case the court limited its role to the application of existing law to the facts 
presented by facts before it. 
B.  Reported Cases Where the Court has Legislated on an Ad Hoc Basis 
In contrast to Friedman, Villa Milano and Gray, the following cases illustrate the 
problems associated with the application of the doctrine predicated upon judicial 
subjectivity.  In each case the court expressed its private view on an underlying 
policy issue that was best addressed through the political process and legislative 
regulation. 
Consider first the case of a contract term found to be unconscionable by virtue of 
being oppressive.  One party, the purchaser, signs an installment credit agreement 
pledging as collateral in the event of non-payment the item purchased together with 
numerous other assets previously purchased from the same seller and agrees that 
upon the non-payment of any one of the items, the seller shall be entitled to 
repossess all the items thus pledged.  Is it unconscionable for the creditor to seize 
and dispose of all the assets pledged? This was the situation in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Company.32  The lower court acknowledged that there was no 
applicable legislation affecting this type of sales agreement and for that reason 
granted the defendant the right to replevy all the items purchased by the plaintiff.33 
The Circuit Court reversed, holding that the agreement was unconscionable, and 
finding the agreement unfair and thus unenforceable. 
But was this agreement really unfair, or more to the point, was it unconscionable? 
Nothing about the agreement conflicted with public policy, and the court below 
acknowledged this.  Nothing in the agreement degraded the contracting process.  
Unquestionably, the seller had drafted and presented for acceptance an agreement 
that gave the seller every advantage should the purchaser default.  It is common 
practice for lenders to take all precautions needed to guard against the risk of default.  
The agreement protected the seller in the event of a default by 1. Giving the seller 
every opportunity to collect what was rightly due the seller, and 2. Deflecting from 
the seller the risk of depreciation and wear and tear that could reasonably be 
expected due to the purchaser’s use of the items pledged as collateral.  In short, the 
agreement was crafted as it was for good reason: the protection of the seller against 
improper actions and conduct by the purchaser.  This raises the question of what was 
wrong with the seller doing so?  By taking sides in the dispute, the Circuit Court 
imposed its view that installment credit agreements need regulation, notwithstanding 
the reality that the agreement was in keeping with locally accepted commercial 
practices, practices not otherwise subject to any public policy prohibition, and that in 
no way compromised the contracting process.  There is no doubt that the purchaser 
received the goods she contracted for.  She also made no claim that she was 
hoodwinked into the transaction or that the transaction was a sham or that she was 
                                                                
32350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
33Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964). 
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made a victim of fraud or duress.  Perhaps most important, there was no denial that 
she was in default of her obligations.  The dissenting judge noted these difficulties in 
his dissenting opinion: 
My view is thus summed up by an able court which made no finding that 
there had actually been sharp practice.  Rather the appellant seems to have 
known precisely where she stood. 
. . . . 
I mention such matters only to emphasize the desirability of a cautious 
approach to any such problem, particularly since the law for so long has 
allowed parties such great latitude in making their own contracts.  I dare say 
there must annually be thousands upon thousands of installment credit 
transactions in this jurisdiction, and one can only speculate as to the effect the 
decision in these cases will have.34
Without doubt, the defendant was in a superior position and was able to dictate 
the terms concerning the collateral for the loan.  Further, the plaintiff was not 
sophisticated or well educated, and unquestionably did not seek assistance of an 
attorney before signing the installment agreement.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff signed 
the agreement and the defendant complied with its obligation to transfer to the 
plaintiff the property that she bargained for.  The court sided with the plaintiff for 
social policy reasons, subjective in nature, and in doing so created a precedent for the 
proposition that an otherwise proper agreement was unenforceable for reasons that 
were outside the accepted commercial standards.  Thus, social policy and 
subjectivity trumped any concerns for the integrity of the contracting process. 
Had the court considered the terms using the accepted rules for contract 
formation, the terms in question would have been sustained.  There was nothing 
about the terms that suggested any transgression that was offensive to our system of 
contracting such as a failure of consideration or a manipulation that attempted to 
disguise a term.  Indeed, just the opposite was the case.  In short, the court’s 
enforcement of the agreement would have been consistent with the standards of the 
day.  The result would have had no adverse impact on the interests of society in an 
efficacious system for contracting.35
                                                                
34350 F.2d at 450-51 (Danaher, J., dissenting). 
35In contrast to the Williams case, consider Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 
824 (N.Y. 1988). There, the defendant assumed an obligation under a letter of credit to make 
full payment of an agreed sum, if required, to a designated third party. The plaintiff executed a 
security agreement that gave the defendant the general lien and right to seize any and all 
deposit accounts that the plaintiff maintained at the defendant bank. After the defendant made 
the payments required under the letter of credit, it learned of events that triggered the general 
lien and made the seizure authorized by the security agreement. Plaintiff was not notified of 
the seizure and issued checks drawn on an account that was seized only to have them returned 
unpaid. Plaintiff sued claiming that the security agreement was unconscionable and the claim 
was rejected. The court found the general lien to be in accord with reasonable commercial 
practice and noted that the defendant, like the defendant in the Williams case, had complied 
with all of its contractual obligations. “Moreover, considering their commercial context, their 
purpose, and their effect, those terms were not so overbalanced in favor of Chase as to be 
found substantively unconscionable.” Id. at 829. In short, the court found that the defendant 
was doing nothing more than assuring that it was made whole for having undertaken to extend 
credit to the plaintiff. It found that there was nothing in the terms of the agreement that if 
enforced that would have had a materially adverse effect on the contracting process itself. 
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The often cited case of Cambell Soup Co. v. Wentz36 underscores the proposition 
that a determination about unconscionability can be used to provide a “get out of jail 
free card” where one party to a contract has clearly made a bad bargain and nothing 
more.  Here a supplier of carrots agreed to supply the plaintiff with all carrots grown 
on a certain plot of land at a fixed price of thirty dollars a ton.  By the time the 
carrots were ready for harvest the market price had surged to $90 a ton.  Realizing 
that it made a bad deal, the grower told the plaintiff that it could not meet its 
obligation and proceeded to sell its produce to a third party.  The court refused to 
grant specific performance citing as the reason the harsh terms of the bargain.37 The 
court properly identified that the seller had made a money-losing compact and then 
preceded to refuse equitable relief on the grounds that to do so would be upholding a 
harsh bargain.  This raises a threshold question: what is wrong with a court’s holding 
a party to the proper terms of a contract, even if harsh? At no place does the 
Campbell court cite any feature in the agreement that was illegal, against public 
policy or defective because it degraded the integrity of the contracting process.  The 
sole reason for refusing to uphold the contract was the court’s reading of a group of 
terms and conditions that favored the plaintiff over the growers.  In other words, the 
court was expressing its subjective views about a money losing arrangement. 
Concerns about overcharging where parties have negotiated the terms should not 
be deemed grounds for a decision about unconscionability absent an objective 
standard linking enforcement to the undermining of the contracting process.  Failure 
to follow this guideline can lead to uncertainty and confusion.  Consider the 
agreement in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso.38 There, a salesman persuaded the 
defendant to sign an installment sales agreement for the purchase of an appliance.  
The salesman manipulated the defendant by making suggestions that the appliance 
would actually cost nothing because of offsets that the plaintiff would pay the 
defendant if the plaintiff made sales to friends and neighbors of the defendant.  
Compounding the situation, the defendant spoke no English, but the agreement that 
he signed was entirely in English.  In reality, the agreement called for the defendant 
to pay an assortment of charges and fees, driving the cost of the appliance up from 
$348 to $1,145.88.  While the court, citing Campbell, made the determination that 
the agreement was unconscionable on the grounds of the excessive price, there was 
no need for it to have done so.  Clearly, there was no meeting of the minds given the 
                                                          
Thus, the court remained out of the dispute, leaving the parties to comply with the terms of the 
agreement that they had struck. Had the court done otherwise, it would have established a 
precedent declaring it unconscionable for a lender to take any and all precautions in the event 
of non-payment by a borrower and the result would have been a chill for commercial activity 
associated with this type of transaction. 
36172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). 
37The court stated: 
The reason that we shall affirm instead of reversing with an order for specific 
performance is found in the contract itself. We think it is too hard a bargain and too 
one-sided an agreement to entitle the plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience. For 
each individual grower the agreement is made by filling in names and quantity and 
price on a printed form furnished by the buyer. This form has quite obviously been 
drawn by skilful draftsmen with the buyer’s interests in mind. 
Id. at 83. 
38274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966), rev’d 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967). 
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manipulations of the salesman.39 The court could have easily found the agreement 
unconscionable as being one that undermined the integrity of the entire contracting 
system.40  In failing to do so, the court established as possible precedent a rule 
predicated on subjectivity. 
                                                                
39Should a court consider the inability of the defendant to read the text of the agreement? 
On balance, the answer is “no.” The defendant clearly would have known that she could not 
read the text and she had the obligation to find out what it said before signing it. If she 
willingly and voluntarily waived obtaining a translation and perhaps advice, she did so at her 
own peril.  
40Consider New York General Business Law § 396(r): 
Price gouging 
1. Legislative findings and declaration. The legislature hereby finds that 
during periods of abnormal disruption of the market caused by strikes, 
power failures, severe shortages or other extraordinary adverse 
circumstances, some parties within the chain of distribution of 
consumer goods have taken unfair advantage of consumers by 
charging grossly excessive prices for essential consumer goods and 
services. 
In order to prevent any party within the chain of distribution of any 
consumer goods from taking unfair advantage of consumers during 
abnormal disruptions of the market, the legislature declares that the 
public interest requires that such conduct be prohibited and made 
subject to civil penalties. 
2. During any abnormal disruption of the market for consumer goods and 
services vital and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of 
consumers, no party within the chain of distribution of such consumer 
goods or services or both shall sell or offer to sell any such goods or 
services or both for an amount which represents an unconscionably 
excessive price. For purposes of this section, the phrase “abnormal 
disruption of the market” shall mean any change in the market, 
whether actual or imminently threatened, resulting from stress of 
weather, convulsion of nature, failure or shortage of electric power or 
other source of energy, strike, civil disorder, war, military action, 
national or local emergency, or other cause of an abnormal disruption 
of the market which results in the declaration of a state of emergency 
by the governor. For the purposes of this section, the term consumer 
goods and services shall mean those used, bought or rendered 
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. This prohibition 
shall apply to all parties within the chain of distribution, including any 
manufacturer, supplier, wholesaler, distributor or retail seller of 
consumer goods or services or both sold by one party to another when 
the product sold was located in the state prior to the sale. Consumer 
goods and services shall also include any repairs made by any party 
within the chain of distribution of consumer goods on an emergency 
basis as a result of such abnormal disruption of the market. 
3. Whether a price is unconscionably excessive is a question of law for 
the court. 
(a)  The court’s determination that a violation of this section has occurred 
shall be based on any of the following factors: (i) that the amount of 
the excess in price is unconscionably extreme; or (ii) that there was an 
exercise of unfair leverage or unconscionable means; or (iii) a 
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Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co.41 illustrates how the lines between 
judicial subjectivity and legislative mandates can become blurred.  There, employees 
of the defendant were injured while performing a maintenance operation.  The 
scaffolding they were working on came in contact with an uninsulated power line 
belonging to Entergy.  As a condition to getting service from Entergy, the employer 
had executed an agreement that required the employer to acknowledge that it was 
unlawful to erect any structure within eight feet of a high voltage line and further 
required that the employer indemnify Entergy for any claims made by anyone 
injured as a result of a violation of the eight foot restriction.  The Mississippi Public 
Service Commission had previously given approval to the terms of the challenged 
agreement and all of the terms including the indemnification provision.  Entergy was 
sued by the injured employees and sought to enforce the indemnification provision.  
The employer claimed the agreement was unconscionable.  The court ruled the 
agreement unconscionable.  It held that Entergy had “legal resources available . . . as 
compared to most of its customers” and that the contract was also one of adhesion.42 
Three Justices dissented, pointing out that the court should not insert its “own public 
policy views” in a case where the legislature has granted broad powers to a 
commission for the purpose of determining public policy.43  Nothing in the 
agreement undermined the integrity of the contracting process.  Indeed, the 
agreement was sanctioned by the public agency with regulatory authority.  The 
court’s intervention placed it squarely in the middle of a dispute that focused on the 
                                                          
combination of both factors in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of this 
paragraph. 
(b)  In any proceeding commenced pursuant to subdivision four of this 
section, prima facie proof that a violation of this section has occurred 
shall include evidence that 
(i)  the amount charged represents a gross disparity between the price of 
the goods or services which were the subject of the transaction and 
their value measured by the price at which such consumer goods or 
services were sold or offered for sale by the defendant in the usual 
course of business immediately prior to the onset of the abnormal 
disruption of the market or 
(ii)  the amount charged grossly exceeded the price at which the same or 
similar goods or services were readily obtainable by other consumers 
in the trade area. A defendant may rebut a prima facie case with 
evidence that additional costs not within the control of the defendant 
were imposed on the defendant for the goods or services. 
4. Where a violation of this section is alleged to have occurred, the 
attorney general may apply in the name of the People of the State of 
New York to the supreme court of the State of New York within the 
judicial district in which such violations are alleged to have occurred, 
on notice of five days, for an order enjoining or restraining 
commission or continuance of the alleged unlawful acts. In any such 
proceeding, the court shall impose a civil penalty in an amount not to 
exceed ten thousand dollars and, where appropriate, order restitution 
to aggrieved consumers.” 
41726 So. 2d 1202 (Miss. 1998). 
42Id. at 1207. 
43Id. at 1209-10. 
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impact of the subject term on just the parties to the agreement in question.  The 
public’s interest in the agreement and in particular in the indemnification provision 
had already been considered and the terms were in no way shown to be disruptive to 
the integrity of the contracting system.  These realities not withstanding, the court 
nevertheless imposed its own public policy views and struck down the agreement as 
unconscionable, and in doing so, established as precedent for the proposition that 
judicial views on public policy can be allowed to trump those of the legislature.44  
Finally, Sosa v. Paulos45 illustrates the lengths that a court will go to impose its 
views about public policy.  This case turned on whether or not the plaintiff had been 
given a meaningful choice when she signed an agreement that contained an 
arbitration clause, and whether or not a provision concerning the payment of costs 
was unconscionable and against public policy.  Her surgeon produced the agreement 
less than an hour before he operated on her.  The agreement called for arbitration and 
required that the arbitrators be board-certified surgeons.  Moreover, the agreement 
required the patient to pay the costs incurred by the defendant in defending himself if 
the arbitration panel awarded the patient less that half the amount being sought in 
arbitration.  But most important, the agreement also contained a provision entitling 
the patient, without restriction, to revoke the agreement within fourteen days after 
signing.  The court struck down the agreement, citing the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  The court acknowledged that there was nothing in the Utah 
Arbitration Act prohibiting an arbitration agreement between a physician and a 
                                                                
44Four years later, the same court, in East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 
2002), struck down an arbitration provision in an agreement signed in connection with sale of 
a truck.  The Taylor court cited as the basis for the decision the discussion in Entergy about 
the relevance of adhesion agreements to the analysis of how a party’s conduct contributes to 
the determination of unconscionability.  The court went on to note that the clause in question 
was one-third the size of many other clauses in the agreement and was preprinted. But 
nowhere in the decision did the court indicate that the clause in any way undermined the 
integrity of the contracting process, and in so doing, it imposed its views on the public policy 
mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act. One Justice dissented, not in the result, but in the 
reasoning. He found that the agreement lacked mutuality of obligation and that as such, it 
undermined the integrity of the contracting system.  Id. at 719 (McRae, J., dissenting).  
See also Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Company, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 643, 646 (N.Y. 1989).  
The Sablosky court held that an arbitration clause in an employment agreement is not 
unconscionable on the grounds that there was nothing in the clause that did violence to the 
integrity of the contracting process.  The court stated as follows: 
Mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration contracts.  If there is consideration 
for the entire agreement that is sufficient; the consideration supports the arbitration 
option, as it does every other obligation in the agreement.  Our holding is consistent 
with decisions which have repudiated the necessity for mutuality of remedy in 
contracts and with similar views of leading commentators.  Since it is settled that the 
validity of an arbitration agreement is to be determined by the law applicable to 
contracts generally, there is no reason for a different mutuality rule in arbitration 
cases.  Moreover, recognition that mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration is 
logically consistent with our recent statement in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. that 
“while coextensive promises may constitute consideration for each other, ‘mutuality’, 
in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor receives 
other valid consideration”. 
Id. at 646.  (citations omitted). 
45924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
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patient.  Nevertheless, it declared that upon “a showing of evidence that a term is so 
one sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party,”46 a term would be 
found to be “substantively” unconscionable.  The court found that the requirement 
that the patient pay the physician’s expenses incurred in defense of the claim to be 
“without precedent in law” and both unconscionable and against public policy.    
Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff was placed in a weaker bargaining 
position by the timing of the presentation of the agreement.47  
Clearly, the court was concerned about a circumstance that was not otherwise 
provided for in the Utah Arbitration Act, i.e., the propriety of an arbitration 
agreement requiring a patient to pay costs and expenses.  Still, nothing in the term 
itself undermined the integrity of the contracting process.  The sole issue was 
whether or not assuming such an obligation had precedent in law.  Without question, 
the term was included in the agreement at the insistence of the defendant.  The 
reason for his insisting on the provision is self-evident; he wanted to discourage what 
he deemed to be a frivolous action requiring him to incur costs associated with a 
defense.  While the terms may have been stark in that they were designed to give a 
patient pause before launching a malpractice claim, there was nothing in the 
provision that, if upheld would cause the court to issue a ruling that would be in 
violation of accepted principals of contract law.  Finally, even if the agreement’s 
provisions and presentation were unconscionable and against public policy, there 
was an escape clause.  Plaintiff failed to protect herself from the very consequences 
she was complaining of to the court.  Even if there was no meaningful choice when 
she signed the agreement, she waived the right to cure the irregularity.  
All of the above cases have in common a stated attempt by the judiciary to 
determine more than just that which is or is not “fair.” There is in each case an 
expression of concern about an underlying policy issue brought to the fore by the 
factual scenario of a given case.  These policy issues should be disposed of by 
legislation, not by judicial fiat.  Each of these above cases could have been disposed 
of simply by measuring the impact of the suspect term against the interests of third 
parties and the court, in each case, could have objectively identified terms as 
unconscionable. 
When considering the risks for abuse and weighing them against the possibility 
of reform as suggested in this Article, recognition must be given to the reality that 
courts rarely declare contract terms unconscionable.  Fears supporting the professed 
need for judicial involvement to guard against overreaching, oppression and unfair 
surprise are almost always unfounded, or if such threats do exist they are not 
sufficient in and of themselves to warrant the risks inherently associated with 
unbridled judicial activism.  Our modern legal system is replete with legislative 
schemes that are designed to protect the unsuspecting from predatory behavior.  If a 
pattern develops suggesting the emergence of an unwarranted practice, the solution 
is to adopt legislation banning the practice.  The role of the judiciary should be 
limited to the enforcement of regulatory schemes and the overall protection of our 
                                                                
46Id. at 362. 
47“Backing out of surgery at that juncture would be difficult for the average person 
experiencing the apprehension and anxiety common to the circumstances. Extraordinary 
assertiveness on Ms. Sosa’s part was not required, since it was the procedure controlled by Dr. 
Paulos that made her vulnerable.” Id. at 363. 
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system for contracting from only those practices that act to undermine what is 
already in place for the protection of the public interest. 
The doctrine as applicable to the commercial arena must be updated to reflect the 
reality of widespread regulatory schemes designed to curb predatory behaviors of all 
kinds.  Given the modern environment, parties to a commercial contract do not 
require the type of judicial oversight that is presently afforded to them in the name of 
unconscionability.  Absent duress or fraud, all contracting parties have available to 
them the option of simply walking away from a contract term that is thought to be 
onerous and unacceptable.  The proper modern day judicial function in this arena 
should be policing against terms that serve to undermine the public’s interest in 
having a reliable system for contracting, not the protection of parties from their own 
missteps and misjudgments. 
III.  RETHINKING THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE FAMILY LAW ARENA 
In the family law arena I propose that an unconscionable term should be defined 
as: 
1. One that undermines the integrity of the contracting system or of any 
statutory scheme that regulates the matrimonial agreements; or 
2.  That appears likely to require any party to a matrimonial agreement to seek 
public assistance; or 
3.  That interferes with the ability of a party to seek reform in order to avoid 
having to seek public assistance. 
Matrimonial agreements are subject to rigorous regulation by statutes that contain 
provisions that restrict judicial activism and contain subjectivity.  The differences 
between matrimonial agreements and commercial agreements do not end with 
regulation.  Private agreements and settlements in the family law arena serve an 
assortment of needs not required in the commercial arena.48 The functions of 
commercial agreements are unlimited, so terms are designed to provide a road map 
for achieving the purpose of each individual contract.  Matrimonial agreements, on 
the other hand, are designed to address a limited number of issues, such as the 
division of property and support and maintenance.49  Matrimonial agreements are 
                                                                
48As the court in DeMatteo v. DeMatteo noted: 
Many valid agreements may be one sided, and a contesting party may have 
considerably fewer assets and enjoy a far different lifestyle after divorce than he or she 
may enjoy during the marriage. It is only where the contesting party is essentially 
stripped of substantially all marital interests that a judge may determine that an 
antenuptial agreement is not “fair and reasonable” and therefore not valid.   Where 
there is no evidence that either party engaged in fraud, failed to disclose assets fully 
and fairly, or in some other way took unfair advantage of the confidential and 
emotional relationship of the other when the agreement was executed, an agreement 
will be valid unless its terms essentially vitiate the very status of marriage. 
762 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Mass. 2002) (citations omitted). 
49In Bonds v. Bonds, the court discussed the differences between commercial and 
matrimonial agreements stating: 
Even apart from the circumstance that there is no statutory requirement that 
commercial contracts be entered into voluntarily as that term is used in Family Code 
section 1615, we observe some significant distinctions between the two types of 
contracts. A commercial contract most frequently constitutes a private regulatory 
agreement intended to ensure the successful outcome of the business between the 
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also unique in that they address rights that initially come into existence not as a result 
of a written agreement, but by virtue of the family relationship, rights that can be 
determined by a court in the absence of an ancillary agreement.  In other words, 
parties to a matrimonial relationship always have an alternative available if disputes 
cannot be resolved privately.  This distinction has a major bearing on the effort to 
define the term “unconscionable” within the context of the family law arena because 
it defeats claims that a given agreement was signed in the absence of a meaningful 
choice.  In addition, by their very nature these contracts have the potential to 
adversely impact not only the contracting parties but also identifiable third party 
beneficiaries, namely children and the state itself.  Given these peculiarities, the rules 
involving unconscionability part company from those applied to commercial 
agreements.50  
It is manifest that the family unit is central to the well being of society and 
therefore all matrimonial arrangements and agreements are subject to regulation and 
scrutiny by the state.51  One of the consequences of the regulatory involvement is that 
there is considerably less room for judicial activism.  Judicial attention is focused on 
the application and interpretation of clearly defined legislative mandates.  For 
example, many of the regulatory statutes prescribe disclosure and independent 
counsel.  The need for judicial determinations “as a matter of law” is replaced by the 
requirement that judicial determinations are to be limited to findings of fact.52  As a 
result, the focus of judicial activism has moved from the social policy emphasis we 
saw with commercial agreements to consideration of the wisdom associated with the 
acceptance of specified terms and conditions found in a matrimonial agreement.  
                                                          
contracting parties – in essence, to guide their relationship so that the object of the 
contract may be achieved. Normally, the execution of the contract ushers in the 
applicability of the regulatory scheme contemplated by the contract and the endeavor 
that is the object of the contract. As for a premarital agreement (or clause of such an 
agreement) providing solely for the division of property upon marital dissolution, the 
parties generally enter into the agreement anticipating that it never will be invoked, 
and the agreement, far from regulating the relationship of the contracting parties and 
providing the method for attaining their joint objectives, exists to provide for 
eventualities that will arise only if the relationship founders, possibly in the distant 
future under greatly changed and unforeseeable circumstances. 
5 P.3d 815, 829 (Cal. 2000). 
50See Paul Marrow & Kimberely Thomsen, Drafting Matrimonial Agreements Requires 
Consideration of Possible Unconscionability Issues, 76 J. N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOC. 26 (2004). 
51“Unlike many private contracts, the state has an interest in every marriage contract.” In 
Re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90, 98 (N.D. 1997). 
52Id.  In Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1022 (R.I. 1994), the court noted: 
Section 15-17-6(d,) states that the “issue of unconscionability of a premarital 
agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of law,” and under subsection 
(a)(2) the agreement must be shown to have been unconscionable “when it was 
executed.” The act, like the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act before it, establishes the standard of unconscionability in the negotiations 
between parties and thereby provides “protection against overreaching, concealment 
of assets, and sharp dealing not consistent with the obligations of marital partners to 
deal fairly with each other.” 
Id. at 1022. 
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Another peculiarity is the availability of modification based on subsequent 
conditions.  Commercial agreements are scrutinized to determine unconscionability 
as of the moment that they are executed.  Thus, contract formation and the facts 
surrounding it are relevant.  Hindsight and subsequent changes in condition are not 
considered.  Matrimonial agreements, on the other hand, are subject to ongoing 
review and judicial modification.  That review may take into account conditions and 
events subsequent to the execution of the agreement.  For example, an agreement to 
pay a set sum as support and maintenance may be reasonable when reached, but if at 
the time of judicial review it can be shown that the effect is to render the recipient a 
welfare charge, reformation can be ordered on the basis of unconscionability.53  
But for all the things that distinguish commercial agreements from those reached 
to memorialize any assortment of family law rights, they share a stark similarity.  A 
contested provision might reflect not unconscionability but rather an unwise 
decision.  Judgments about propriety are unavoidably subjective.  No public interest 
is served when a court attempts to measure the unconscionability of a term claimed 
inauspicious by an examination of correctness.  Doing so undermines the basic tenet 
that parties must make good on any lawful commitment or agreement freely 
reached.54  Claims of unconscionability should not be recognized if the outcome is 
nothing more than relief from a valid pledge or promise. 
                                                                
53In New York at least, if the provision is embedded in a separation agreement that 
survives a divorce, the order or judgment can be modified at a later date but only upon a 
showing of “extreme hardship,” not unconscionability.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 236(B)(9)(b).  This would seem to indicate that an extreme hardship is something less than 
unconscionability. See Sass v. Sass, 716 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
54As the court stated in Simeone v. Simeone: 
Further, the reasonableness of a prenuptial bargain is not a proper subject for judicial 
review.  Geyer and earlier decisions required that, at least where there had been an 
inadequate disclosure made by the parties, the bargain must have been reasonable at 
its inception. See Geyer, 516 Pa. at 503, 533 A.2d at 428. Some have even suggested 
that prenuptial agreements should be examined with regard to whether their terms 
remain reasonable at the time of dissolution of the parties’ marriage. 
By invoking inquiries into reasonableness, however, the functioning and reliability of 
prenuptial agreements is severely undermined.  Parties would not have entered such 
agreements, and, indeed, might not have entered their marriages, if they did not expect 
their agreements to be strictly enforced.  If parties viewed an agreement as reasonable 
at the time of its inception, as evidenced by their having signed the agreement, they 
should be foreclosed from later trying to evade its terms by asserting that it was not in 
fact reasonable.  Pertinently, the present agreement contained a clause reciting that 
“each of the parties considers this agreement fair, just and reasonable . . . .” 
Further, everyone who enters a long-term agreement knows that circumstances can 
change during its term, so that what initially appeared desirable might prove to be an 
unfavorable bargain. Such are the risks that contracting parties routinely assume.  
Certainly, the possibilities of illness, birth of children, reliance upon a spouse, career 
change, financial gain or loss, and numerous other events that can occur in the course 
of a marriage cannot be regarded as unforeseeable. If parties choose not to address 
such matters in their prenuptial agreements, they must be regarded as having 
contracted to bear the risk of events that alter the value of their bargains. 
We are reluctant to interfere with the power of persons contemplating marriage to 
agree upon, and to act in reliance upon, what they regard as an acceptable distribution 
scheme for their property.  A court should not ignore the parties’ expressed intent by 
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Judicial subjectivity and activism carry unique consequences in the family law 
arena.  Cases involving matrimonial rights are often contentious, and concerns about 
judicial subjectivity can make it impossible for the parties to understand and accept 
judicial determinations.  The less subjective the rules and standards used in 
determining unconscionability, the more likely it is that the parties will respect the 
outcome.  
Of all the expressions used to describe conduct that is said to be unconscionable, 
in the family law arena, the ones most frequently heard are “overreaching” and 
“unequal bargaining position.” The dangers presented by such conduct have been 
addressed, in large measure, by the existing regulatory schemes. 
Overreaching can easily be confused with duress and even fraud.  But it must be 
kept in mind that it is neither.  What the three terms have in common is the reality of 
manipulation and dominance by one party.  But this is where the commonality ends.  
Duress implies that the right to refuse to sign was cut off and that the subject 
agreement was not entered into voluntarily.55  Fraud requires deceitful concealment 
of a material fact.56  But where unconscionability is the issue, neither of these factors 
is present and the alleged putative party always has available an alternative: not 
signing and resolving the issue in court. 
A domineering and controlling spouse can easily be pigeonholed as one who 
hijacks his or her mate by taking unfair advantage of emotional weaknesses revealed 
during the course of the relationship.57  A classic claim is overreaching by a male 
who demands, as a condition of marriage, a prenuptial agreement from a would-be 
wife who is already pregnant with his child.  Frequently, the dominating spouse is 
also the sole provider and therefore has the upper hand regarding knowledge of the 
family’s financial affairs.  Many cases involve claims that a domineering spouse has 
                                                          
proceeding to determine whether a prenuptial agreement was, in the court’s view, 
reasonable at the time of its inception or the time of divorce. These are exactly the 
sorts of judicial determinations that such agreements are designed to avoid. Rare 
indeed is the agreement that is beyond possible challenge when reasonableness is 
placed at issue.  Parties can routinely assert some lack of fairness relating to the 
inception of the agreement, thereby placing the validity of the agreement at risk.  And 
if reasonableness at the time of divorce were to be taken into account an additional 
problem would arise. Virtually nonexistent is the marriage in which there has been 
absolutely no change in the circumstances of either spouse during the course of the 
marriage. Every change in circumstance, foreseeable or not, and substantial or not, 
might be asserted as a basis for finding that an agreement is no longer reasonable.  
581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990). 
55See, e.g., Knutson v. Knutson, 639 N.W.2d 495, 503 (N.D. 2002); Lyons v. Lyons, 734 
N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), app. den. sub nom. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 771 
N.E.2d 834 (N.Y. 2002). 
56See, e.g., Matter of Phillips, 58 N.E.2d 504 (N.Y. 1944); Panossian v. Panossian, 569 
N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). See also Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for 
the Naughtiness of Procedural Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11 (2003). 
57See, e.g., Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“In mid-
1985, plaintiff informed defendant that he would divorce her unless she agreed to certain 
terms regarding their economic relationship.  To punctuate his demand, plaintiff moved out of 
the marital bedroom and into an apartment above the garage.”).  See also Mathie v. Mathie, 
363 P.2d 779 (Utah 1961).  
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withheld financial information and/or meddled in the selection of an attorney.58  
These activities lead to a baseline argument that an offending agreement was 
executed because “the devil made me do it.”  This argument is emotionally 
explosive.  As a result, courts frequently perceive the need to step in and restore the 
status quo by application of the doctrine of unconscionability.  Judicial activism at 
this level can give the appearance, if not the reality, of subjectivity. 
The harsh reality is that the devil’s behavior notwithstanding, an acceptable 
alternative always exists: The complaining party has the option to refuse to sign, and 
that refusal does not cut off the right to have issues resolved by a court at some later 
time.  
Today many of the concerns categorized as “overreaching” and/or evidence of an 
“unequal bargaining position” are addressed by legislation.59  Some statutes even 
take into account the concerns of those who are collaterally impacted by matrimonial 
agreements.  Those that leave the term “unconscionable” undefined are best 
interpreted so as to inhibit judicial activism and subjectivity.  Application of the 
proposals made in this Article simplifies and standardizes the ambiguities left 
unresolved by the legislature. 
A.  Role of Regulatory Schemes in Defining Unconscionability 
Modern statutory schemes regulating family relationships address many, if not 
all, “procedural” matters and reduce the need for judicial determinations at law 
concerning conduct during the negotiation phase of contract formation.  Judicial 
intervention is confined to determinations about the impact of terms and conditions.  
By limiting the circumstances that can be judged unconscionable, and in particular, 
restricting the scope of the inquiry to the impact a term has on children of the 
marriage or the state as suggested in this Article, the concept of unconscionability as 
applicable to the family law arena is modernized and the possibilities for subjectivity 
dramatically reduced. 
The concept of unconscionability is a component part of virtually every 
regulatory scheme that involves matrimonial agreements.60  Most  statutes focus on 
                                                                
58See Levine v. Levine, 436 N.E.2d 476 (N.Y. 1982); Goodison v. Goodison, 399 N.E.2d 
952 (N.Y. 1979); Tal v. Tal, 601 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).  See also Nancy 
Schembri, Note, Prenuptial Agreements and the Significance of Independent Counsel, 17 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 313 (2003). 
59See infra notes 61, 62, 63 and 65. 
60There are exceptions. For example, a Wisconsin statute on property division states:  
Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning 
any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be binding upon the 
court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the terms of the agreement 
are inequitable as to either party. The court shall presume any such agreement to be 
equitable as to both parties. 
WIS. STAT. § 767.255(3)(L) (2004) (emphasis added).  In Minnesota, the statute regulating 
antenuptial and postnuptial contracts does not directly mention unconscionability.  Instead the 
statute requires that such agreements must be “procedurally and substantively fair and 
equitable both at the time of its execution and at the time of its enforcement . . . .” MINN. 
STAT. § 519.11(1a)(1) (2004).  “Inequitable” has been interpreted to have substantive aspects 
not dissimilar from those traditionally found in the doctrine of unconscionability.  See Button 
v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546 (Wis. 1986). 
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unconscionability within the context of support and maintenance and specifiy the 
exact contents of matrimonial agreements and list conditions required to assure that 
the agreement will be legally enforceable.61  The result is that while the opportunity 
                                                                
61For example, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”), Section 3, provides as 
follows: 
CONTENT.  
(a) Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:  
 (1) the rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property 
of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;  
 (2) the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, 
consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, 
encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property;  
 (3) the disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, 
or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;  
 (4) the modification or elimination of spousal support;  
 (5) the making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the 
provisions of the agreement;  
 (6) the ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life 
insurance policy;  
 (7) the choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and  
 (8) any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in 
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.  
(b) The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a 
premarital agreement. 
 
In New York, the Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) is applicable to any matrimonial 
agreement and provides that parties can make provisions in four areas: 1) Testamentary 
dispositions and waivers of the right of election; 2) ownership, division or distribution of 
separate and marital property; 3) maintenance; and 4) custody, care, education and 
maintenance of children of the marriage.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3). 
The Uniform Marital Property Act (“UMPA”) has been adopted in Wisconsin. Section 
766.58 on marital property agreements permits separation agreements and makes them subject 
to the doctrine of unconscionability:  
(1) A marital property agreement shall be a document signed by both 
spouses.  Only the spouses may be parties to a marital property 
agreement.  A marital property agreement is enforceable without 
consideration. 
(2) A marital property agreement may not adversely affect the right of a 
child to support. 
(3) Except as provided in §§ 766.15, 766.55 (4m), 766.57 (3) and 859.18 
(6), and in sub. (2), in a marital property agreement spouses may agree 
with respect to any of the following: 
(a) Rights in and obligations with respect to any of either or both spouses 
property whenever and wherever acquired or located. 
(b) Management and control of any of either or both spouses property. 
(c) Disposition of any of either or both spouses property upon dissolution 
or death or upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event. 
(d) Modification or elimination of spousal support, except as provided in 
sub. (9) 
(e) Making a will, trust or other arrangement to carry out the marital 
property agreement. 
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(f) Providing that upon the death of either spouse any of either or both 
spouses property, including after-acquired property, passes without 
probate to a designated person, trust or other entity by 
nontestamentary disposition.  Any such provision in a marital property 
agreement is revoked upon dissolution of the marriage as provided in 
s. 767.266 (1) If a marital property agreement provides for the 
nontestamentary disposition of property, without probate, at the death 
of the 2nd spouse, at any time after the death of the first spouse the 
surviving spouse may amend the marital property agreement with 
regard to property to be disposed of at his or her death unless the 
marital property agreement expressly provides otherwise and except to 
the extent property is held in a trust expressly established under the 
marital property agreement. 
(g) Choice of law governing construction of the marital property 
agreement. 
(h) Any other matter affecting either or both spouses property not in 
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty. 
(3m) Chapter 854 applies to transfers at death under a marital property 
agreement. 
(4) A marital property agreement may be amended or revoked only by a 
later marital property agreement. 
(5) Persons intending to marry each other may enter into a marital 
property agreement as if married, but the marital property agreement 
becomes effective only upon their marriage. 
(6) A marital property agreement executed before or during marriage is 
not enforceable if the spouse against whom enforcement is sought 
proves any of the following: 
(a) The marital property agreement was unconscionable when made. 
(b) That spouse did not execute the marital property agreement 
voluntarily. 
(c) Before execution of the marital property agreement, that spouse: 
1.  Did not receive fair and reasonable disclosure, under the circumstances, 
of the other spouses property or financial obligations; and 
2.  Did not have notice of the other spouses property or financial 
obligations.   
. . . . 
(8) The issue of whether a marital property agreement is unconscionable is 
for the court to decide as a matter of law.  In the event that legal 
counsel is retained in connection with a marital property agreement 
the fact that both parties are represented by one counsel or that one 
party is represented by counsel and the other party is not represented 
by counsel does not by itself make a marital property agreement 
unconscionable or otherwise affect its enforceability. 
WIS. STAT. § 766.58(1)-(6), (8) (2004). 
 
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”) has been adopted in some form in eight 
states.  In Kentucky, section 403.180 of the Revised Statutes provides: 
Separation agreement – Court may find unconscionable (1) To promote 
amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage 
attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, the 
parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing 
provisions for maintenance of either of them, disposition of any 
property owned by either of them, and custody, support and visitation 
of their children. 
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(2) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, the 
terms of the separation agreement, except those providing for the 
custody, support, and visitation of children, are binding upon the court 
unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the 
parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on 
their own motion or on request of the court, that the separation 
agreement is unconscionable. 
(3) If the court finds the separation agreement unconscionable, it may 
request the parties to submit a revised separation agreement or may 
make orders for the disposition of property, support, and maintenance. 
(4) If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unconscionable 
as to support, maintenance, and property: 
(a) Unless the separation agreement provides to the contrary, its terms 
shall be set forth verbatim or incorporated by reference in the decree 
of dissolution or legal separation and the parties shall be ordered to 
perform them; or . . . .  
(b) If the separation agreement provides that its terms shall not be set forth 
in the decree, the decree shall identify the separation agreement and 
state that the court has found the terms not unconscionable. 
(5) Terms of the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by all 
remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including 
contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms. 
(6) Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of 
children, the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of 
terms if the separation agreement so provides. Otherwise, terms of a 
separation agreement are automatically modified by modification of 
the decree. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.180 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).  Compare the Kentucky statute 
with § 236 B (3) New York Domestic Relations Law: 
Maintenance and distributive award.  3. Agreement of the parties. An agreement by 
the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a 
matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties, and 
acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded. Such 
an agreement may include (1) a contract to make a testamentary provision of any kind, 
or a waiver of any right to elect against the provisions of a will; (2) provision for the 
ownership, division or distribution of separate and marital property; (3) provision for 
the amount and duration of maintenance or other terms and conditions of the 
marriage relationship, subject to the provisions of section 5-311 of the general 
obligations law, and provided that such terms were fair and reasonable at the time of 
the making of the agreement and are not unconscionable at the time of entry of final 
judgment; and (4) provision for the custody, care, education and maintenance of any 
child of the parties, subject to the provisions of section two hundred forty of this 
chapter. Nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed to affect the validity of any 
agreement made prior to the effective date of this subdivision.  
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (emphasis added).  
 
The New York statute is silent with respect to the applicability of the doctrine to arrangements 
involving the ownership, division or distribution of separately owned and marital property.  
The Court of Appeals in Christian v. Christian, however, a case decided before the adoption of 
New York’s Equitable Distribution statute, determined that prenuptial agreements are subject 
to the traditional doctrine because “unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary 
relationship requiring the utmost of good faith.  There is a strict surveillance of all transactions 
between married persons, especially separation agreements.  Equity is so zealous in this 
respect that a separation agreement may be set aside on grounds that would be insufficient to 
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for judicial activism is substantially reduced if not eliminated.  Many of the schemes 
specify that so called “procedural” matters, i.e., those involving the conduct of the 
parties in the negotiation of the agreement, are to be dealt with by the courts as 
matters of fact.62  Assuming that the applicable statutes are complied with, a compact 
is improper from the perspective of unconscionability only if the operation on any 
party has an unacceptable consequence.  “Unacceptable” almost always is a function 
of economic fairness, an issue that calls upon courts to rule on adequacy and 
propriety, issues that are per se subjective.63  
                                                          
vitiate an ordinary contract.”  365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) (citations omitted).  
Subsequent rulings have determined that Christian is applicable to agreements governed by the 
Domestic Relations Law.  See Goldman v. Goldman, 500 N.Y.S.2d 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1986); Zipes v. Zipes, 599 N.Y.S.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
In Minnesota all matrimonial agreements are required “to be procedurally and substantively 
fair and equitable both at the time of . . . execution and at the time of . . . enforcement.”  MINN. 
STAT. § 519.11(1a)(2)(c).  
62UPAA Section 6(a)(2), adopted in twenty-seven states provides as follows: 
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom 
enforcement is sought proves that  
  (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before 
execution of the agreement, that party:  
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or 
financial obligations of the other party;  
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to 
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party 
beyond the disclosure provided; and  
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate 
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party 
 . . . . 
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2) (2004). 
Some states like Colorado limit the proof of procedural matters.  Colorado Revised Statute § 
14-2-307(1)(b) provides as follows: “Enforcement. A marital agreement or amendment thereof 
or revocation thereof is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought 
proves . . . (b) Before execution of the agreement, amendment, or revocation, such party was 
not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the 
other party.”  COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-307(1)(b) (2004).  In Minnesota, the statute provides 
that “[a] post nuptial contract or settlement is valid and enforceable only if at the time of its 
execution each spouse is represented by separate counsel.”  MINN. STAT.  
§ 519.11(1a)(2)(c). 
63A number of cases have determined that an agreement is unconscionable if by its terms a 
spouse is rendered a public charge, a risk that outweighs the freedom to contract.  See Lutz v. 
Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N. D. 1997); In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1993); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Justus v. Justus, 581 N.E.2d 1265 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  Some statutes 
identify the state as a third party beneficiary and either prohibit enforcement of any term that 
renders a signatory a public charge or give the court the power to order the other party to 
provide a level of support that will eliminate that possibility.  See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
311 (2004): Except as provided in section 236 of the domestic relations law, a husband and 
wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve either of the liability to 
support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-support and 
therefore will likely become a public charge.  See also UPAA § 6(b):   
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and 
that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for 
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Consider an agreement that provides for support and maintenance.  
Determinations about what is an appropriate amount for support and maintenance, if 
made by an agreement between the parties, can only be seen as being adequate or 
inadequate.  There is no middle ground.  If it is inadequate in the eyes of the 
supposed beneficiary, it is so only if the bargain, when made, was a poor bargain.  
But, as has been noted throughout this Article, a poor bargain is not necessarily an 
unconscionable bargain.64  Somehow it has to be established that there is something 
more that compels the conclusion that the bargain is unconscionable. 
But what standard should the court apply?  The standard cited in New York’s 
Christian v. Christian,65 that there must be inequality that is so “strong and manifest 
as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any [person] of common 
sense,”66 provides little guidance.  In actuality this “standard” is undefined and 
ephemeral, telling us little if anything.  By contrast, if the agreement renders the 
complaining party a public charge, public policy has been violated and there is no 
need for a subjective determination.67  
The issue of economic neediness requring involvement by the state comes into 
focus: (1) when the agreement is signed; (2) upon review by a court at the time of a 
divorce proceeding; and (3) at anytime following a divorce decree, assuming that the 
agreement survives the divorce order or judgment. 
When a matrimonial agreement is signed, it must be at the very least fair and 
reasonable,68 equitable, and not unconscionable under the Uniform Family Law Acts.  
In states like New York, stated public policy prohibits any agreement that when 
signed contains a provision that can result in either party becoming “incapable of 
self-support and therefore . . . likely to become a public charge.”  When reviewed by 
a court at the time of a divorce proceeding, the Uniform Acts entitle courts to review 
the current circumstances of the parties to determine if the agreement is unfair or 
unconscionable.  Finally, in the aftermath of a divorce proceeding the terms of the 
agreement can be scrutinized, taking into account the current circumstances of the 
party suggesting unconscionability, except that in states like New York, the review 
                                                          
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital 
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other 
party to provide support to the extent necessary to void that eligibility. 
64See McFarland v. McFarland, 519 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1987); Christian v. Christian, 365 
N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1977); Clermont v. Clermont, 198 A.D. 2d 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 
1993); Cantamessa v. Cantamessa, 170 A.D. 2d 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1991); 
Golfinopoulos v. Golfinopoulos, 144 A.D. 2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1988). 
65365 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1977). 
66Id. at 855. 
67It follows that if an obligation to pay maintenance is so great that it creates the 
possibility that the party making such payments will become a public charge, or conversely 
that the amounts being paid are so paltry as to require payments by the state, the obligation 
must be reformed to avoid an unacceptable result.  Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 764 N.E.2d 950, 
953 (N.Y. 2001).  
68“In our view, a ‘conscionability’ standard is not the same as a ‘fair and reasonable’ 
standard.  Although there may be substantial overlap between the standards, a standard of 
conscionability generally ‘requires a greater showing of inappropriateness.’” Upham v. 
Upham, 630 N.E.2d 307, 310-11 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). 
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must be made to determine if there is proof of extreme hardship.69 The standard of 
extreme hardship, clearly something greater than a mere change in circumstances is, 
like the term unconscionable, vague and difficult to pin down.  For that reason, the 
standard ought to be, at the least, a contract term that interferes with a party’s ability 
to seek reform and avoid having to seek public assistance.  This criterion does not 
require a party to wait until after becoming a public charge to seek relief.  
The vast majority of prenuptial agreements deal exclusively with the distribution 
of property brought to the marriage by the parties, as well as the distribution of 
property acquired during the marriage.  Occasionally, provision is made for 
maintenance and support.  In states such as New York, these provisions must be “fair 
and reasonable” when made and not “unconscionable” when application is made to 
the court for an order of divorce.  Other states permit a court to review the terms for 
support upon application for a divorce taking into consideration a change in 
circumstances.70  A change in circumstances is a standard that does not speak to 
unconscionability, as is the case with “fair and reasonable.”  Indeed, even in New 
York, the standard for review, extreme hardship at anytime after the entry of a 
judgment, is a standard that does not address unconscionability.  The Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act71 requires as a condition for enforcement adequate 
disclosure and evidence that the agreement was entered into voluntarily, thereby 
removing from the determination issues involving the actions of the parties in the 
contract formation process in favor of a requirement that the court make 
determinations as a matter of fact on certain specified matters.  The rules urged in 
this Article speak to the operation of the agreement on third parties in large measure 
because neither children nor the state have the benefit of disclosure or the 
opportunity to negotiate.  Unconscionability is separated from issues of disclosure 
and deliberateness.  This suggests that the definition must lie someplace other than 
with the actions of the parties themselves.   
Support and maintenance issues appear frequently in separation agreements and 
stipulations of settlement.  The Uniform Acts deny enforcement if a provision is 
                                                                
69See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(9)(b).  See also Pintus v. Pintus, 480 N.Y.S.2d 501 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-22 (2004) provides:  
A married person may make contracts, oral and written, sealed and unsealed, with her 
or his spouse, or any other person, in the same manner as if she or he were sole. 
An agreement between spouses providing for periodic payments for the support and 
maintenance of one spouse by the other, or for the support, maintenance, and 
education of children of the parties, when the agreement is made in contemplation of 
divorce or judicial separation, is valid provided that the agreement shall be subject to 
approval by the court in any subsequent proceeding for divorce or judicial separation 
and that future payments under an approved agreement shall nevertheless be subject to 
increase, decrease, or termination from time to time upon application and a showing 
of circumstances justifying a modification thereof.  
All contracts made between spouses, whenever made, whether before or after June 6, 1987, 
and not otherwise invalid because of any other law, shall be valid. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-22. 
(emphasis added). 
70See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 416 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1980); Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 602 A.2d 
741 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984); Gentry v. 
Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990). 
71UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2). See MINN. STAT. § 519.11(1). 
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unconscionable when signed.  However, these acts also require, as a condition for 
enforcement and a denial of a finding of unconscionability, financial disclosure and 
evidence that the agreement was entered into voluntarily.72  The practical effect of 
these provisions is the same as that described above concerning premarital 
agreements.  The Acts permit parties a great deal of latitude provided that there is 
adequate disclosure and evidence that the agreement was entered into voluntarily.  
Unconscionability is separated from issues of disclosure and deliberateness 
suggesting that the definition must lie someplace other than with the actions of the 
parties themselves.   
Arrangements involving the distribution of property are unlikely to result in a 
party becoming a public charge and are therefore best considered using the general 
rules that apply to commercial contracts.73  Yet even here virtually all statutory 
schemes in effect today impose a requirement that there be adequate disclosure.  
Most statutory schemes also compel parties to seek the advice of independent 
counsel.  The judicial role has been limited to ensuring compliance with the statutory 
mandates.  The existing statutory setting hints at the rules of construction suggested 
in this Article.  As has already been noted, conduct of the parties is, in some 
schemes, eliminated as an issue of law.  The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
provides that a prenuptial agreement is not enforceable if it was not voluntarily 
executed, was unconscionable when executed, there was a failure to provide fair and 
reasonable disclosure, or one party did not have adequate knowledge of the other 
party’s property or financial obligations.74  Moreover, the UPAA provides that where 
a premarital agreement causes one party to become eligible for public assistance at 
the time of separation or divorce, the court may modify the terms to avoid such 
eligibility.75  Similarly, the Uniform Marital Property Act requires disclosure and 
deems unenforceable any agreement not entered into voluntarily.  Moreover, this Act 
bars parties from making agreements that adversely affect the rights of a child to 
support.76  In addition, the Act gives the court the power to modify any agreement 
that results in a party’s becoming eligible for public assistance.77  The Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act removes from any consideration about unconscionability 
the issues of custody, support and visitation of children and limits inquiry about 
                                                                
72See supra notes 60, 61, 62, and 63.   
73See, e.g., Gross v. Gross, 646 N.E.2d at 509.  Upon the consideration of provisions 
relating to the division or allocation of property at the time of a divorce, the applicable 
standards must relate back to the time of the execution of the contract and not to the 
time of the divorce.  As to these provisions, if it is found that the parties have freely 
entered into an antenuptial agreement, fixing the property rights of each, a court 
should not substitute its judgment and amend the contract.  A perfect or equal division 
of the marital property is not required to withstand scrutiny under this standard.   
Id. 
74UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(1), (2). 
75UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b). 
76WIS. STAT. § 766.58(2), (6).  
77WIS. STAT. § 766.59(9)(b). 
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unconscionability to “the economic circumstances of the parties and any other 
relevant evidence produced by the parties.”78
B.  Representative cases 
A review of some recently reported decisions illustrates the problems presented 
by judicial activism in the family law arena.  There are common threads running 
through all the decisions discussed in this subsection.  They exemplify the 
consequences of how judicial activism can trap a court into becoming embroiled in 
the propriety of the actions of the parties.  In each case: 
One party made a very poor decision;  
There was no compulsion to sign the contested agreement or stipulation; 
and 
The party contesting the agreement or stipulation had available as an 
alternative to signing the right to petition a court for relief. 
Consider first Crawford v. Crawford.79  In this case, the husband was a doctor 
and the wife was college-educated with professional training in the field of criminal 
justice.  The wife, however, had taken a job as a meat wrapper earning a paltry 
salary.  Under a stipulation, the husband received title to the marital dwelling subject 
to a mortgage and custody of the children.  He also agreed to pay the wife spousal 
support for only six months.  The wife agreed to a visitation schedule and also to pay 
a nominal sum as child support.  After judgment was entered incorporating the 
stipulation’s terms the wife had second thoughts and sought reformation, claiming, 
among other things, that she had not fully understood what she was doing because of 
treatments she was receiving for a brain tumor.  The lower court found that the wife 
knew what she was doing when she signed the settlement; she was well educated and 
had not offered any proof that her health impaired her judgment.  The appeals court 
reversed, giving as the reason the dramatic disparity in income between the parties 
and the fact that the stipulation entitled the husband to keep most of his income, 
leaving the wife to make do with little more than her meager salary.80  In the court’s 
effort to justify the finding of unconscionability, it ignored the reality that nothing in 
the stipulation suggested that the wife was placed at risk of qualifying for public 
                                                                
78The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has been adopted in eight states.  The language 
quoted is from the Kentucky version. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.180.  The Kentucky act 
is silent as to disclosure and independent representation.  The version adopted in Arizona 
makes no reference to unconscionability.  Instead, it speaks to economic arrangements that are 
fair and reasonable.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-317 (2004).   See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-
10-112 (2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201 (2004); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 519.11.  
79524 N.W.2d 833.  
80The court stated: 
We agree that the stipulation is so one-sided and creates such hardship that it is 
unconscionable. Under the stipulation, Kenneth retained almost all of his $ 130,000 
income and acquired custody of the couple’s four children, whose primary care Leslie 
had provided throughout Kenneth’s lengthy education and training. Leslie, having 
survived the brain tumor, acquired a degree that to date has not provided her with 
earnings of more than $ 3,600 annually. 
Id. at 835. 
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assistance.  The court conceded her education and the potential that it suggested, but 
nevertheless ignored the actuality that her circumstances were of her own making.  
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Neumann objected to the vague standard 
used to define unconscionability and pointed out that the majority was inviting other 
judges to indulge in patronizing, paternalistic meddling “with very little guidance or 
principle other that [their] own personal sense of what feels fair and right.”81  Justice 
Neumann properly recognized that there was nothing about the settlement that in 
anyway undermined the integrity of the contracting process or the enabling statute.  
The wife had simply made a deal that, for whatever reason, she subsequently 
regretted.  From the perspective of precedent, Crawford tells the observer only about 
judicial attitudes on the subject of saving people from their own poor decisions.82
Pacelli v. Pacelli83 is an extreme example of the same phenomena.  This case 
involved the entire spectrum of economic concerns, including support, maintenance 
and equitable distribution.  The parties entered into a “mid-marriage agreement” 
after the husband expressed his desire for a divorce.  The wife resisted the 
dissolution of the marriage and accepted the terms of the agreement hoping that her 
marriage could be saved.  When the agreement was signed, the husband had a net 
worth of $6,053,100.  The wife was unemployed.  The marital estate was valued at 
approximately $3,000,000.  Under the agreement, in the event of a divorce the wife 
agreed to accept a lump sum payment of $540,000.84  In exchange, the wife granted 
the husband a release from any claim for equitable distribution and alimony.  Prior to 
signing the agreement, the wife consulted with an attorney who advised her against 
signing it.  She disregarded this advice because of her hope that her cooperation 
would insure the viability of the marriage.  Eight years later the husband sought a 
divorce.  By this time his net worth had increased to $11,241,500 and the marital 
estate had increased to approximately $8,000,000.  
The court made it clear that it knew a bad deal when it saw one.  The court first 
concluded that the agreement was “unfair” when signed: 
We conclude that in 1985 the marital estate was $ 3,000,000 . . . . Thus, 
the $ 540,000 provided in the agreement was 18% of the marital estate.  
[The husband’s lawyer] testified that he had advised plaintiff that he could 
expect “the probable range of equitable distribution could be somewhere 
around . . . one-third.  Could be less, it could be more.” [The wife’s 
lawyer] testified that an equitable distribution range would be between 
thirty and forty percent of post-marital assets.  Thus, the $ 500,000 buy 
out was approximately half of a potential equitable distribution award, 
using the low end of the range. 
                                                                
81Id. at 837 (Neumann, J., dissenting). 
82For additional examples of unwarranted judicial intervention designed to save a party 
from a poor decision see In re Marriage of Richardson, 606 N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 
Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 90; Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 599 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1993). 
83725 A.2d 56. (N.J. Super Ct. 1999) 
84The wife received $40,000 as consideration for signing the agreement.  The balance, if 
any, was to be paid upon entry of a judgment of divorce.  Id. at 62. 
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The $ 500,000 also purchased defendant’s waiver of alimony.  An 
alimony award in 1985 would have been substantial, perhaps approaching 
six figures.  Plaintiff’s annual income in 1984 and 1985 averaged $ 
500,000.  The parties lived well.  They lived in an expensive home, drove 
luxury automobiles and vacationed at some of the most desirable 
destinations.  Plaintiff estimated that defendant spent $ 20,000 to $ 30,000 
per year on clothing from stores such as Bergdorf Goodman.  Their son, 
Tony, went to Deerfield Academy, and Franco went to Choate.85
The court then determined that the agreement was “unfair” when measured at the 
time of the divorce. 
It is apparent that the agreement is also unfair when measured in 1994.  At 
that time, plaintiff’s net worth exceeded $ 11,000,000, and post-martial 
assets were $ 8,000,000.  Thus, $ 540,000 is approximately seven percent 
of the 1994 assets.  The parties built a home at the Saint Andrews Club in 
Florida after executing the agreement.  It is in joint names and defendant 
is entitled to one-half of the $ 1,200,000 equity, or $ 600,000.  Even 
considering this asset, defendant’s distribution is less than fifteen per cent 
of the marital estate.  In light of the inherently coercive circumstances 
leading to the agreement, the result is unfair, inequitable and 
unenforceable.  The trial court, on remand, must make determinations 
regarding equitable distribution and alimony, and other ancillary 
economic issues, if any.86   
Unquestionably, the wife in Pacelli had made a series of very poor decisions.  
• She disregarded her attorney’s advice not to sign the agreement;  
• She permitted herself to be swayed by her compulsion to save her 
marriage; and 
• She accepted monetary terms that were not in her best interests. 
As was the case in Crawford, there was nothing about the language of the Pacelli 
agreement that suggested that the wife was destined to seek public assistance or that 
such an application was imminent.  As was the case in Crawford, there was no 
suggestion that the contested terms served to undermine the integrity of either the 
contracting system or any enabling statute.  In Pacelli there is the additional fact that 
at the time that the wife signed the agreement, the husband had advised her that he 
wanted a divorce.  Her husband’s declaration gave rise to the immediacy of her 
rights to petition a court to settle her claims for alimony and a property settlement.  
By signing the agreement she waived her entitlement to judicial intervention.  Yet 
the court, for no reason grounded in law, reinstated her right to seek equitable 
distribution.87
                                                                
85Id. at 62-63. 
86Id. at 63. 
87Husbands are just as likely to make poor decisions when it comes to marital rights.  
Consider what happened in Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 752 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001).  There, the husband, without the benefit of counsel, agreed to transfer the marital home 
to the wife.  He further agreed that he would make all payments against the mortgage until it 
was satisfied and would pay all real estate taxes on the property until the children of the 
marriage turned eighteen even if the wife remarried or cohabited with another adult.  “Here, 
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As a contrast to Crawford and Pacelli, consider Steiner v. Steiner.88 There, the 
husband signed an agreement to pay alimony.  Some years later, he sought to have 
this obligation terminated claiming ill health and an increase in the wife’s income 
from other sources.  When the agreement was signed, the husband’s primary source 
of income was his military disability payments.  While his physical condition had 
deteriorated, that fact did not have a negative impact on his benefit payments.  In 
fact, while his medical expenses had increased, so had is disability payments.  The 
court would not get involved: 
What must be kept in mind concerning this divorce is that the property 
settlement agreement was just that, an agreed payment whereby Kenneth 
contracted with his former spouse as part of an overall property agreement 
to make payments of $ 900 per month for periodic alimony.  That 
Kenneth might have made a bad deal does not relieve him of his duty to 
live up to his end of the bargain.  In property and financial matters 
between the divorcing spouses themselves there is no question that, absent 
fraud or overreaching, the parties should be allowed broad latitude.  When 
the parties have reached agreement and the chancery court has approved 
it, we ought to enforce it and take as dim a view of efforts to modify it, as 
we ordinarily do when persons seek relief from their improvident 
contracts.89
Also, as a contrast to Crawford and Pacelli, consider the circumstances in 
Haynes v. Haynes,90 a case that involved the distribution of marital property.  The 
husband won $3,000,000 in a state lottery.  The wife was aware of his good fortune.  
Some months later the husband advised his wife that he wanted a divorce.  The wife 
elected not to resist.  The husband asked his attorney to draft the necessary papers 
and they were presented to the wife.  Her signature was sought, and she willingly 
gave it.  Embedded in the documentation was an affidavit that contained a waiver of 
her right to equitable distribution.  She did not seek advice from an attorney and no 
one explained to her the consequences of her signature.  The court refused to 
reinstate the wife’s claim to equitable distribution: 
It is extremely well-settled that “a party will not be excused from his [or 
her] failure to read and understand the contents of a release.”  When a 
party signs a document without having read its contents and without any 
valid excuse for having failed to do so, such party is chargeable with 
knowledge of its terms (citations) and is “conclusively bound” thereby  
. . . . 
                                                          
the clauses in the agreement requiring defendant to pay off the mortgage and to pay property 
taxes until the children turn 18 are not per se unconscionable.  In our view, although defendant 
may have ‘given more’ than he might legally have been compelled to give, considered in its 
totality, the separation agreement hardly ‘shocks the conscience.’”  Id. at 107 (citations 
omitted).  See also Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So. 2d 771 (Miss 2001); Knutson v. Knutson, 639 
N.W.2d 495 (N. Dakota 2002). 
88788 So. 2d 771. 
89Id. at 776 (citation omitted). 
902003 N.Y. Slip Op. 50867U (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2003). 
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While it might not have been prudent for Yvonne Haynes to have signed 
the waiver, her action does not “confound judgment” and it does not 
“shock the conscience” to hold her to the consequences of her actions.91
The situation in Yuda v. Yuda92 provides a good illustration of a case where a 
court properly found unconscionability based on the conclusion that terms of an 
agreement could reasonably result in a party having to seek public assistance.  There, 
the husband committed himself to pay maintenance in an amount that was so great 
that he was in danger of becoming a public charge.  In addition, the wife had 
possession of the marital home and was free to sell it when she, in her sole 
discretion, deemed it appropriate.  When sold, the husband was entitled to half the 
net proceeds from the sale.  The court declared the agreement unconscionable, citing 
the illusory nature of the agreement’s provisions applicable to the home together 
with the observation that the support provisions of the agreement, as a practical 
matter, would render the husband in danger of becoming a public charge.  Neither of 
these reasons was subjective in the sense that they were rooted in a limited desire to 
correct for poor judgment.93
                                                                
91Id. at 7, 9 (citations omitted). 
92533 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
93Sanders v. Sanders, 287 A.2d 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972), is another example of 
a decision based upon a concern over public assistance.  This time the fear was linked to a 
demand to dispose of real property.  The parties purchased a home shortly after they were 
married.  The husband provided the cash portion of the purchase price and the parties assumed 
liability for the mortgage.  Title was taken as tenants by the entirety.  Throughout the duration 
of the marriage, the husband made all payments for the mortgage together with taxes and 
insurance.  The wife made no contributions towards the purchase price or the servicing of the 
mortgage and payment of other expenses associated with the home.  Some years later she left 
her husband.  While the parties did not have an agreement, the manner of holding title served a 
similar function.  The parties petitioned the court for disposition of the home.  At the time, the 
husband’s sole source of income was his social security benefits.  In addition, he was going 
blind and had other physical problems. The court held: 
We find that taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of this case – the 
equities of the parties, the course of conduct of the parties on acquisition, support and 
maintenance of the marital abode over the years, the age, health and infirmities of the 
parties, her abandonment of the marital abode and the marital status (and indeed the 
marriage, which was the only reason for her enjoying an interest in the title to the 
premises) – such rigorous relief as sought and provided under the old law of 
distribution of marital property upon divorce would, in this case, be inequitable, unjust 
and unconscionable.  It would cause an old man who has dutifully in good faith 
provided a home for himself and his wife, his family, to lose his home to a much 
younger woman who has fled the marital abode, abandoned the marriage and now 
seeks to liquidate her legal interest at his expense.  At his age and with his infirmities 
and limited income, he would be unable to refinance his home to protect his interest 
on partition sale, or to purchase her interest or another home.   Such an action under 
the circumstances of this case violates the whole concept of tenancy by the entirety as 
a protection of the parties to a marriage as security to both spouses during coverture of 
marital assets that were the work product of their marital economic life and the 
additional security to the surviving spouse upon the termination of their union by 
death of the other. 
Id. at 465-66. 
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All of the above cases, if resolved using the rules suggested in this Article, would 
have resulted in determinations about unconscionability that were free from 
subjectivity.  The courts in Crawford and Pacelli could have made the determination 
about unconscionability by looking no further than the issue of public assistance.  In 
both cases the denial of the claim of unconscionability would have been justified 
because in each case the petitioner was capable of caring for herself without the 
benefits provided for in the contested agreement.  The Steiner and Yuda courts made 
their determinations by considering the question of the outer boundaries of the need 
for public assistance.  The Haynes court properly found nothing in the petitioner’s 
cooperation that suggested anything other than a poor decision. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It is not an accident that there are no hard and fast rules for the defining what is 
meant by “unconscionable.”  Legislatures and courts have approached the possibility 
with foreboding, fearing that restrictions on the doctrine might result in the 
elimination of a fail-safe mechanism against predatory practices not otherwise 
addressed by the law.  But as illustrated in this Article, these fears are not justified.  
Our current legal system has as a bedrock tradition the evolution of legislation for 
the control and regulation of the human inclination to take unfair advantage.  These 
legislative designs are a statement of the public’s interest in the preservation of a 
flexible and reliable system for contract integrity.  Placing limitations on the ability 
of the courts to expand on the legislature’s declaration of public policy outweighs the 
risk that a deserving petitioner will be denied relief.  The role of the judiciary should 
therefore be restricted to either the enforcement of the legislative schemes or 
pronouncements about public policy that serve to supplement, not displace, the 
legislative schemes.  The rules outlined in this proposal provide the proper balance.  
The rules proffered here assume that it is appropriate for private parties to freely 
reach agreements with two provisos: (1) that in doing so the parties must be prepared 
to live up to the agreement and (2) the arrangement is not otherwise in conflict with 
public policy.  These rules also assume that the public has an interest in insuring that 
parties refrain from agreeing to terms that, if enforced, undermines the integrity of 
our contracting system or, in the special case of matrimonial agreements, to force the 
state to provide public assistance or adversely impact the rights of children of a 
marriage.  To the extent that these conditions are met, judicial declarations about the 
resulting unconscionability of the term are appropriate.  
Acceptance of these rules by the public and the judiciary will require a great deal 
of adjustment.  No longer will it be possible for parties to claim the right to be 
divested of responsibilities assumed by the contracting process.  For their part, 
judges will have to relinquish the power to assist those they perceived as being either 
an underdog or disadvantaged by chance circumstances, and by doing so will have to 
forego the granting of  “get out of jail free” cards to those who, for whatever reason, 
enter into improvident arrangements.  The judiciary will have to short-circuit any 
inclination to substitute a judge’s wisdom about the propriety of any arrangement in 
favor of policing against only those terms that impact the public interest.  The search 
for what is and what is not unfair to or for a party to an agreement will have to be 
abandoned in favor of keeping an eye out for terms that should be unenforceable 
because of their impact on the public’s interest in a reliable system for contracting.   
Only those who are not prepared to accept responsibility for a poor decision stand 
to lose by my proposal.  There is no public interest in facilitating the avoidance of an 
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
224 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:187 
improvident compact.  Excuses such as failure to understand a term, an inability to 
afford the assistance of counsel, failure to read the contract, overreaching, inequality 
in bargaining position or the insistence of a party on the use of a standard form 
agreement, and issues involving the behavior of the parties during the contract 
formation process, fail to justify a declaration of unconscionability because none 
explain why the aggrieved party accepted the agreement.  In the final analysis the 
requirement that a party must honor a commitment is in the public interest and only 
proof of fraud, duress or violation of a stated public policy should be sufficient to 
justify exculpation from a commitment made.  
The rules being proposed empower courts to provide a fail-safe mechanism.  If 
these rules are implemented, then there will be a change in judicial focus.  The 
emphasis will shift from excuses allowed to absolve a party from responsibility to an 
emphasis on the elimination of threats by private parties to the integrity of the system 
for contracting.  
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